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SIERRA CLUB V MEIBURG. OUT, DAMNED POLLUTANTS!
OUT, WE SAY! WHAT, WILL GEORGIA's WATER
NE'ER BE CLEAN?
I. INTRODUCTION
Water covers approximately three-quarters of the Earth and
serves as the lifeblood of the planet.1 While a human can survive
without food for more than a month, a human without water can-
not survive more than a week. 2 Nevertheless, many humans treat
lakes, estuaries and rivers as free dumping grounds without con-
sidering the harmful effects of their actions. 3 Georgia exemplifies
such careless disregard.4
During the Clean Water Act's 5 (CWA) first sixteen years, Geor-
gia failed to comply with the mandates of the Act.6 From 1988 to
1997, toxic chemicals discharged into Georgia's waters increased by
more than 400 percent.7 At one point, thirty-five percent of munic-
ipal facilities operated in violation of the CWA. 8 As a result, Geor-
gia's rivers and streams contain more toxic chemicals than those
in either New York or New Jersey.9 Approximately sixty percent
of Georgia's monitored waterways fail to meet water-quality stan-
dards. 10 Consequently, the water is not safe for swimming, fishing
1. Earthjustice, Water, available at http://www.earthjustice.org/program/
water/ (last visited Jan. 11, 2004) [hereinafter Earthjustice] (discussing Earth's
water mass).
2. Id. (describing how rivers are planet's vascular system).
3. Id. (listing ways Earth's water is abused).
4. See Sierra Club v. Hankinson, 939 F. Supp. 865, 867 (N.D. Ga. 1996) [here-
inafter Sierra Club I] (explaining factual background); Georgia Center for Law in
the Public Interest, The Clean Water Enforcement Project, available at http://www.cle-
angeorgia.org/projects/water/index.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2004) (criticizing
Georgia's water pollution).
5. The Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2001).
6. See Sierra Club I, 939 F. Supp. at 867 (explaining factual background of
case).
7. Georgia Center for Law in the Public Interest, The Clean Water Enforcement
Project, available at http://www.cleangeorgia.org/projects/water/index.html (last
visitedJan. 11, 2004) (criticizing Georgia's water pollution).
8. Id. (describing EPA's failure in controlling unlawful pollution).
9. Id. (comparing Georgia's pollution to other states).
10. Georgia Conservancy, Current Issues: Water Quality - TMDLs, available at
http://www.gaconservancy.org/WaterQuality/WQGroup-_WaterQuality.asp (last
visited Jan. 11, 2004) (explaining total maximum daily loads).
(367)
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or drinking purposes." In fact, five animals in aquatic habitats
throughout Southwest Georgia are on the endangered and threat-
ened species list.12 The plaintiffs in Sierra Club v. Meiburg (Sierra
Club III) sought Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) perform-
ance of its duties under the CWA and restoration of Georgia's wa-
ters to their natural state.' 3
Section II of this Note presents the facts of Sierra Club IlL 4
Section III examines the CWA's regulatory scheme, the form and
role of injunctions in civil litigation, and the appellate courts' juris-
diction over and review of modified injunctions. 15 Section IV dis-
cusses the Eleventh Circuit's holding and reasoning in Sierra Club
111.16 Section V presents a critical analysis of the Eleventh Circuit's
decision to reverse the trial court's modification.' 7 Finally, Section
VI of this Note assesses the impact of the Eleventh Circuit's holding
on Georgia's waters, as well as both of the parties.' 8
II. FACTS
In 1972, Congress passed the CWA to "restore and maintain
the chemical, physical and biological integrity of the Nation's wa-
ters."' 9 During the CWA's first sixteen years, Georgia consistently
failed to comply with the Act's mandates. 20 By 1996, hundreds of
11. See Earthjustice, supra note 1 (describing problems that result from water
pollution).
12. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, The ACF and ACT Basins: Water Allocation and
Natural Resource Protection, available at http://athens.fws.gov/rivers/ACTACF.html
(last visited Jan. 11, 2004) (discussing concerns for endangered or threatened spe-
cies in Georgia).
13. See Sierra Club I, 939 F. Supp. 865, 868-69 (N.D. Ga. 1996) (outlining plain-
tiffs' case).
14. For a discussion of the facts, see infra notes 19-43 and accompanying text.
15. For a discussion of the CWA's regulatory scheme, the form and role of
injunctions in civil litigation, and the appellate courts'jurisdiction over and review
of modified injunctions, see infra notes 44-115 and accompanying text.
16. For a discussion of the Eleventh Circuit's holding and reasoning in Sierra
Club III, see infra notes 116-43 and accompanying text.
17. For a critical analysis of the Eleventh Circuit's decision to reverse the trial
court's modification, see infra notes 144-76 and accompanying text.
18. For a discussion of the impact of the Eleventh Circuit's decision, see infra
notes 177-90.
19. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (outlining Congressional goals).
20. See Sierra Club I, 939 F. Supp. 865, 867 (N.D. Ga. 1996) (explaining factual
background of case). Georgia did not submit water quality limited segment lists
(WQLSs) until late 1992, more than thirteen years after the first submission dead-
line. Id. at 869. After Georgia finally submitted the list, EPA failed to approve or
disapprove the submission within thirty days, pursuant to the CWA. Id. Despite
Georgia's repeated delays, EPA ultimately approved Georgia's 1994 WQLS. Id.
Georgia submitted only two total maximum daily load determinations (TMDLs)
for the 340 WQLSs identified in sixteen years. Id. at 871. Neither of the submis-
2
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Georgia's waters were significantly polluted and failed to meet ap-
plicable CWA water standards.21
In 1994, the plaintiffs, Ogeechee River Valley Association, Inc.,
Trout Unlimited, Sierra Club, Georgia Environmental Organiza-
tion, Inc., and Coosa River Basin Initiative, Inc., brought suit
against EPA pursuant to the CWA and the Administrative Proce-
dure Act (APA).22 The plaintiffs sought to compel EPA to execute
its duties under the CWA. 23 Specifically, the plaintiffs sought to en-
force the CWA's provisions commanding EPA to identify polluted
waters by promulgating water quality limited segment lists (WQLSs)
and establishing total maximum daily load determinations (TM-
DLs) for the WQLSs. 24
At trial, both Sierra Club and EPA filed cross-motions for sum-
mary judgment.25 After reviewing the record and hearing oral ar-
gument, the District Court for the Northern District of Georgia
concluded that "EPA's approval of Georgia's totally inadequate
TMDL submissions and schedule for submission of TMDLs [was]
arbitrary and capricious.., therefore, the plaintiffs [were] entitled
to summary judgment on the TMDL issue." 26 To create basic pa-
rameters of a short- and long-term TMDL process while guaran-
teeing the defendants' ultimate responsibility for completing each
step in the process, the district court entered an injunction against
EPA.27 The injunction instituted the following measures: (1)
TMDL development; (2) TMDL implementation; (3) progress re-
ports of the development and implementation process; (4) continu-
sions satisfied the requirements of the CWA because they failed to provide daily
limits for priority pollutants on the WQLSs. Id.
21. See id. (explaining factual background of case).
22. See id. at 866 (outlining procedural posture of case); see also 5 U.S.C. § 701
(2001) (providing authority for judicial review of agency actions).
23. See Sierra Club I, 939 F. Supp. at 866, 868-69 (outlining plaintiffs' case).
The plaintiffs alleged that EPA has a duty to develop WQLSs for Georgia and estab-
lish TMDLs because the state failed to submit timely or adequate WQLSs or
TMDLs. See id. at 868 (explaining plaintiffs' case). Furthermore, the plaintiffs as-
serted that EPA's approval of Georgia's inadequate submissions and EPA's failure
to disseminate its own WQLSs and TMDLs are arbitrary and capricious. See id.
24. See id. at 866 (outlining remedies sought by plaintiffs). For a discussion of
TMDLs, see infra notes 54-59 and accompanying text.
25. See Sierra Club 1, 939 F. Supp. at 866 (explaining procedural posture).
26. See id. at 867 (summarizing court's conclusions). With respect to the wa-
ter quality limited segment issue, the court denied both parties motions for sum-
mary judgment. See id. (summarizing court's conclusions).
27. See Sierra Club v. Hankinson, 939 F. Supp. 872 (N.D. Ga. 1996) [hereinaf-
ter Sierra Club I1] (entering injunction that detailed and assigned responsibilities in
TMDL process to parties).
2004]
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ing jurisdiction; and (5) attorneys' fees, costs and expenses. 28 EPA
appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment and the
subsequent injunction. 29
In 1997, during EPA's pending appeal, the parties entered into
a consent decree that the district court approved.30 The decree in-
stituted a schedule for Georgia to establish TMDLs for polluted wa-
ters. 3 1 If Georgia failed to comply with the decree, EPA would
establish TMDLs for WQLSs through 2004.32 In addition, the de-
cree required EPA to establish TMDLs for twenty-one percent of
Georgia's waterways. 33 Further, the decree provided for EPA review
of Georgia's continued planning and implementation process.3 4
By the close of 1997, EPA calculated 124 TMDLs for Georgia's
waters.3 5 Nevertheless, once EPA established TMDLs, neither EPA
nor Georgia utilized them. 36 As a result, the consent decree had a
negligible impact on water quality in Georgia.3 7
Frustrated by the lack of progress under the decree, the Sierra
Club filed a motion to re-open the decree and compel further EPA
action.3 8 In response, Georgia promised to develop implementa-
28. See generally id. (detailing terms of injunction).
29. Sierra Club v. Meiburg, 296 F.3d 1021, 1027 (11th Cir. 2002) [hereinafter
Sierra Club III] (outlining procedural history of litigation concerning Georgia's
water quality).
30. See id. (describing outcome of initial litigation).
31. See Sierra Club v. EPA, 1997 N.D. Ga. Civ. Action File No. 94-CV-2501-
MHS at 10 (detailing terms of consent decree). The consent decree scheduled
EPA to establish TMDLs for the Savannah, Ogeechee, Suwannee, Satilla,
Ochlocknee, St. Mary's, Oconee, Ocmulgee, Altamaha, Flint, Chattahoochee,
Coosa, Tallapoosa and Tennessee basins from 1999-2004. Id. at 11-13.
32. See Sierra Club III, 296 F.3d at 1027 (detailing EPA's responsibilities pursu-
ant to terms of consent decree).
33. See id. (detailing EPA's responsibilities pursuant to terms of consent de-
cree). The 1998 TMDLs are the subject of the appeal in Sierra Club III. See id.
(explaining factual basis for appeal).
34. See Sierra Club v. EPA, 1997 N.D. Ga. Civ. Action File No. 94-CV-2501-
MHS at 14 (detailing EPA supervisory authority over Georgia's responsibilities
under decree).
35. See Sierra Club III, 296 F.3d at 1027-28 (explaining EPA's compliance with
consent decree). EPA established all but eight of the required TMDLs. See id.
Sierra Club promptly filed a motion to compel EPA to establish the remaining
eight TMDLs. See id. at 1028.
36. See id. (explaining continued failure to implement provisions of CWA by
both Georgia and EPA). Georgia failed to implement TMDLs or utitlize them in
its non-point source management plans. See id. at 1028 (explaining Georgia's con-
tinued failure to implement provisions of CWA).
37. See id. (noting that "only one of ... 124 waterbodies on Georgia's 1996
§ 303(d) list met water quality standards").
38. See id. at 1023, 1028 (explaining Sierra Club's efforts to enforce decree).
Sierra Club requested a court order requiring EPA to prepare implementation
4
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tion plans.3 9 As a result, the district court postponed ruling on
Sierra Club's motion. 40 After Georgia submitted its implementa-
tion plans, EPA asserted that the plans rendered the Sierra Club's
motion moot.41 The district court disagreed, concluding that the
consent decree required EPA to either promulgate implementation
plans or guarantee the adequacy of Georgia's plans. 42 EPA ap-
pealed, asserting that the court's decision to require an implemen-
tation plan modified the decree, and that the court abused its
discretion in modifying the decree.43
III. BACKGROUND
A. The Clean Water Act's Statutory and Regulatory Scheme
1. Point Sources
Congress passed the Clean Water Act "to restore and maintain
the chemical, physical and biological integrity of the Nation's wa-
ters."' 44 Section 301 (a) of the CWA prohibits discharge of all pollu-
tants, except those authorized by permit.45 Pursuant to the Act,
EPA issues permits for point source pollution. 46 A point source is
"any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance .. from which
pollutants are or may be discharged. '47 Each source presents a
"point" from which to measure the amount of pollutant dis-
charged.48 EPA issues permits to individual pollutant dischargers
plans for the 124 established TMDLs. See id. at 1028. EPA contested Sierra Club's
motion, arguing that the decree did not require EPA to implement TMDLs. See id.
39. See id. (explaining Georgia's response to Sierra Club's motion).
40. See Sierra Club III, 296 F.3d at 1028 (discussing district court's reaction to
Georgia's initiative regarding TMDLs).
41. See id. (noting EPA's repeated efforts to dismiss Sierra Club's action). Si-
erra Club defended its motion from the mootness threat on the ground that Geor-
gia's plans were inadequate. See id.
42. See id. (summarizing district court's rationale for denying EPA mootness
claim).
43. See id. at 1024 (highlighting issues raised by EPA on appeal).
44. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2003) (stating Congressional goals for CWA). To
achieve this goal, EPA has two main responsibilities: (1) issuing permits that gov-
ern pollutant discharge, and (2) setting water quality standards. Sierra Club III, 296
F.3d at 1024.
45. 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (a) (2001) (declaring discharge of pollutants illegal ex-
cept when authorized by law).
46. See id. at § 1311(b)(2) (establishing framework for meeting CWA objec-
tives).
47. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2003) (defining point sources).
48. See Sierra Club III, 296 F.3d at 1024-25 (defining point source).
2004]
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through the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System(NPDES).49
2. Non-Point Sources
To regulate non-point source pollution, the CWA requires
states to establish water quality standards. 50 In establishing water
quality standards, a state designates a specific use for a body of
water and sets the water quality level necessary to safely accommo-
date that use.51 The state must register all polluted waters and file a
report with EPA for approval. 52 If the regulation of point source
discharges pursuant to the NPDES does not lead to the necessary
water quality levels, then the state must establish TMDLs. 53
3. Total Maximum Daily Loads
A TMDL is a specified maximum amount of an individual pol-
lutant that may pass daily through a body of water without violating
water quality standards.54 The state must establish TMDLs for each
body of water for which point source regulations fail to achieve the
established water quality levels.55 The CWA imposes responsibility
on the state to regulate non-point source discharges through imple-
mentation of TMDLs.5 6 As part of the implementation plan, a state
must prepare a management program certified by the state's attor-
ney general. 57 The program must identify: (1) management prac-
tices and procedures; (2) programs for implementing management
49. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2001) (establishing framework for issuing permits
under NPDES). "Although EPA has authority to issue permits, it has delegated
that authority to the states ... including Georgia." Sierra Club III, 296 F.3d at 1026.
50. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(a)-(c) (2001) (establishing regulatory scheme for water
quality standards and implementation plans).
51. See id. at § 1313(c) (2) (A) (explaining states' responsibilities with regard
to water quality standards and implementation plans). The particular level estab-
lished by the state becomes that waterbody's water quality standard. See id.
52. See id. at § 1313(d) (1)-(2) (establishing regulatory scheme for identifying
areas with insufficient pollution controls and establishing maximum daily loads).
Each body of water on the list is a "water quality limited segment." See 40 C.F.R.
§ 130.20) (2001).
53. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d) (1) (A), (C) (2001) (establishing when TMDLs must
be promulgated).
54. See id. at § 1313(d) (1) (C) (defining TMDLs and ordering establishment);
40 C.F.R. § 130.2(e) (defining TMDL).
55. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d) (1) (A), (C) (outling states' responsibilities for creat-
ing TMDLs).
56. See generally 33 U.S.C. § 1329 (2001) (establishing regulatory scheme for
non-point source discharges).
57. See id. at § 1329 (b) (2) (A)-(D) (establishing regulatory scheme and states'
responsibilities in TMDL implementation).
6
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procedures; and (3) annual milestones.58 While a state is responsi-
ble for preparing lists of polluted waters and establishing and im-
plementing the corresponding TMDLs, EPA still retains ultimate
approval authority.59
B. Injunctions
1. Generally
An injunction is an equitable writ issued by a court that re-
quires a party to either perform or refrain from a specific act.60 In
issuing an injunction, a court employs its institutional clout to com-
pel the desired conduct. 6 1 As a remedy that applies to future con-
duct, many circumstances limit an injunction's predictive value and
efficiency. 62
2. Consent Decrees
A consent decree is an injunction entered into through the
parties' consent.63 Although convenient, consent decrees often
produce further impediments to a dispute's resolution. 64 Due to
inequalities in parties' bargaining power and information accessibil-
ity, consent decrees may be "even less durable than a fully litigated
order."65 Furthermore, as a function of its nature and its purpose,
a decree becomes less responsive over time.66 As time passes,
58. See id. (establishing regulatory scheme and states' responsibilities in
TMDL implementation).
59. See id. at § 1313(d)(1)-(2), 1329(b)(1)-(2) (establishing division of au-
thority between EPA and states). If EPA rejects a state's lists or TMDLs, EPA must
issue an appropriate list or TMDL. Id. at § 1313(d) (2).
60. See BLACKS LAw DICTIONARY (Bryan A. Garner ed., 7th ed. 1999). The
equitable remedy of injunctions creates an interesting paradox. SeeJohn F. Dob-
byn, INJUNCTIONS (West Publ'g Co., In A Nutshell Series, 1974) (providing general
overview of injunctions and injunctive relief). "It is among the most ancient and
most modem forms of relief available through our legal system." Id.
61. See Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, From Swift to Stotts and Beyond: Modification of
Injunctions in Federal Courts, 64 TEX. L. REv. 1101 (1986) (explaining role of injunc-
tions in judicial remedies).
62. See id. (listing circumstances that interfere with court's prediction). A
court's predictive power is limited by (1) new statutes and regulations and chang-
ingjudicial precedent, (2) traditional drafting limitations, and (3) the court's abil-
ity to predetermine a violator's future conduct based on his present and past
conduct. See id. at 1101-02 (explaining limitations on injunctive relief).
63. See id. at 1102 (explaining factors that interfere with effectiveness of in-
junctions).
64. See id. (explaining factors that interfere with effectiveness of injunctions).
65. SeeJost, supra note 61, at 1103 (explaining inequality between parties ef-
fect on efficiency of consent decree).
66. See id. at 1103-04 (explaining factors contributing to consent decrees' inef-
fectiveness). While an injunction responds to a dynamic problem, it is static in
2004]
7
Archambault: Sierra Club v. Meiburg: Out, Damned Pollutants - Out, We Say - Wh
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2004
374 VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL
changes in fact, law or information may affect a decree's responsive-
ness.67 With all of these factors straining the decree, it may either
oppress the violator it seeks to control, or leave the victim without
protection.68 To thwart the effect of time, parties adjust to changes;
masters or other court-appointed agents set decrees; or courts inter-
pret decrees' terms.69 In extreme circumstances, courts will modify
a decree's terms. 70
C. Appellate Jurisdiction and Inquiry of Modifications
Title 28 of the United States Code section 1292 (a) (1) provides
appellate jurisdiction over district court interlocutory orders that
either modify or refuse to modify injunctions. 71 In Birmingham Fire
Fighters Ass'n 117 v. Jefferson County,72 the Eleventh Circuit held that,
in determining the ripeness of a district court's order under section
1292(a) (1), the appellate court must: (1) consider whether there is
an injunctive decree; and (2) consider whether the lower court's
order "changed the underlying decree in a jurisdictionally signifi-
cant way."73 An order modifies the decree when it changes the par-
nature. See id. at 1103 (explaining inherent problem with injunctions that causes
inefficiency).
67. See id. at 1104 (explaining factors contributing to consent decrees' ineffec-
tiveness).
68. See id. (explaining how injunction may stray from its purpose).
69. See id. at 1104-05 (explaining how parties and courts counter time's effect
on injunction).
70. SeeJost, supra note 61, at 1104-05 (explaining where modification is appro-
priate to remedy inefficient injunction).
71. 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (a) (1) (2001) (providing appellate jurisdiction over dis-
trict modification orders).
[T] he courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from: (1) Inter-
locutory orders of the district courts of the United States, the United
States District Court for the District of the Canal Zone, the District Court
of Guam, and the District Court of the Virgin Islands, or of the judges
thereof, granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunc-
tions, or refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions, except where a direct
review may be had in the Supreme Court.
Id. (providing jurisdiction to courts of appeals).
72. 280 F.3d 1289 (lth Cir. 2002).
73. See id. at 1292 (citing Sierra Club v. Marsh, 907 F.2d 210, 212 (1st Cir.
1990)) (stating test to determine if modification occurred). An order modifies a
decree if it changes the underlying decree in ajurisdictionally significant way. See
id. at 1292-93 (distinguishing interpretation from modification).
In Birmingham, the plaintiff class of male, non-black city employees challenged
the city's hiring practices as discriminatory. See id. at 1290-91. The class appealed
the interlocutory order of the district court, which stated that the prior consent
decree required the class to show adverse impact of the city's procedures. See id. at
1292. The class contended that the order was ripe for appeal as a modification of
the consent decree, because the decree clearly required the city to show the ab-
sence of discriminatory impact in its hiring practices. See id. The city claimed that
[Vol. XV: p. 367
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ties' legal relationship as established by the original decree.7 4 In
Sizzler Family Steak Houses v. Sizzlin Steak House, Inc.,75 the Eleventh
Circuit explained that the facts are dispositive; a district court char-
acterizing its order as a clarification or interpretation rather than a
modification enjoys no deference in the appellate court's jurisdic-
tional determination.76
The reviewing court generally does not scrutinize the details of
the injunction or subsequent order.77 A meticulous judicial inquiry
runs contrary to the jurisdiction-granting purpose of section 1292.78
In Birmingham, the Eleventh Circuit stressed that a narrow reading
of section 1292(a) (1) is necessary to prevent the dangers of piece-
meal appeals. 79 To resolve whether a district court's order modi-
fied an injunction, the reviewing court must determine whether the
district court's appraisal of the decree is a "gross misinterpretation
of the decree's original command. 80
review was unavailable because the order merely interpreted the consent decree.
See id. The appellate court held that the order was not subject to interlocutory
review, because (1) the order did not change the underlying consent decree in a
jurisdictionally significant way; (2) it did not change the legal relationship of the
parties; and (3) the district court's reading of the consent decree was not a blatant
misinterpretation of the decree's original command. See id. at 1294-95 (finding in
favor of appellees).
74. See id. at 1293 (citing Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 178 F.3d 951, 957
(7th Cir. 1999)) (restating proper test to determine jurisdiction). "Their legal re-
lationship does not change merely because the district court finds that one party
has satisfied some of the pre-existing requirements of the decree; instead, to effect
a change in the legal relationship of the parties, the order must 'change the com-
mand of the earlier injunction, relax its prohibitions, or release any respondent
from its grip.'" Id. (citing Sierra Club v. Marsh, 907 F.2d 210, 213 (1st Cir. 1990)).
75. 793 F.2d 1529, 1539 (11th Cir. 1986). "What matters, however, is not the
district court's characterization of its order as amendatory or explanatory but
rather the actual effect of the order on the obligations of the parties as set forth in
the original judgment." Id.
76. Birmingham, 280 F.3d at 1292 (citing Gautreaux, 178 F.3d at 956-57) (hold-
ing that facts are dispositive to resolution of whether order modified decree); see
Sizzler Family Steak Houses v. Western Sizzlin' Steakhouse, 793 F.2d 1529, 1539
(11th Cir. 1986).
77. Birmingham, 280 F.3d at 1293 (recognizing need for relaxed judicial
inquiry).
78. See id. (justifying need for relaxed judicial inquiry).
79. See id. (citing Switzerland Cheese Ass'n v. E. Home's Market, Inc., 385 U.S. 23,
24 (1966); United States v. Hialeah, 140 F.3d 968, 973 (11th Cir. 1998); Marsh, 907
F.2d at 214).
80. Id. at 1293. "[A]n analysis [that] aim[s] to uncover subtle rather than
blatant misinterpretations ... is . . . too searching for a preliminary jurisdictional
inquiry." Id. (citing Gautreaux, 178 F.3d at 958).
Limiting our inquiry to a search for only blatant misinterpretations blocks
the statute's modification provision from serving as a back door to appel-
late review of every administrative clarification the district court makes,
while it simultaneously retains this court's authority to look behind labels
when those labels obviously mischaracterize the order.
20041
9
Archambault: Sierra Club v. Meiburg: Out, Damned Pollutants - Out, We Say - Wh
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2004
376 VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAw JouRNAL [Vol. XV: p. 367
D. Modification of Injunctions in Federal Court
1. Generally
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) (5)-(6) (the
Rule), parties may move to modify an injunction or other equitable
decree.81 The Rule permits a court to relieve a party from an order
if the order is no longer equitable or for any other reason.8 2 The
Rule codified the existing law established in United States v. Swift &
Co. 8 3
2. Strict Approach
In Swift, the Supreme Court first recognized a court's power to
modify an injunction.8 4 Swift involved an acrimonious antitrust
clash between the United States and the Nation's five leading meat-
packers.8 5 The district court entered a consent decree settling the
dispute.8 6 Later, the district court modified the decree due to
changed conditions in the meat-packing and grocery industries that
made the decree's provisions unduly oppressive.8 7 In reviewing the
court's modification power, the Supreme Court stated that an in-
Id. (citing Gautreaux, 178 F.3d at 957).
81. SeeJost, supra note 61, at 1105 (explaining courts' modification power); see
also Fleming James, Jr. & Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., CMqL PROCEDURE § 12.15 at 686
(4th ed. 1992) (explaining modification power granted by Rule).
Boilerplate provisions within a decree do not give a court any more power to
modify than it already possesses under Rule 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. See Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367 (1992) (examining
courts' power to modify earlier decree).
82. See FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5)-(6) (granting authority to modify earlier
injunction).
83. 286 U.S. 106 (1932); Jost, supra note 61, at 1105 (explaining origins of
Rule).
84. See generally Swift, 286 U.S. 106 (finding inherent power and reserved
power to modify).
85. See generally Swift & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 311 (1928) (discussing
facts of case extensively); United States v. California Canneries, 279 U.S. 553
(1929) (discussing facts of case leading to Swift). The United States alleged that
the defendants suppressed competition in the purchase and sale of livestock and
dressed meats and extended their monopoly into other related industries. See
Swift, 286 U.S. at 110 (outlining parties' allegations).
86. Swift, 286 U.S. at 111 (explaining holding from which parties' appealed).
The decree forbid the defendants from (1) maintaining the monopoly, (2) hold-
ing interest in stockyard companies, (3) engaging in producing, selling, or trans-
porting 114 food products, (4) using their distribution plants for any of the
banned products, (5) selling meat retail, (6) holding interest in a storage facility,
and (7) selling fresh milk or cream. Id.
87. See id. at 113-14 (explaining facts leading to case before Court).
10
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junction's explicit terms may reserve such power to a court.8 8 The
Court noted that absent a reservation, a court's inherent equitable
power permits it to modify an injunction.8 9 According to Justice
Cardozo, a court's modification power remains unaffected whether
it enters the injunction by consent or after litigation.90 In either
circumstance, a court does not relinquish "power to revoke or mod-
ify its mandate" if the decree becomes "an instrument of wrong"
through changed circumstance. 91
The Court then formulated the standard for courts to utilize
when reviewing a lower court's discretion to modify a decree. 92
The inquiry for us is whether the changes are so important
that dangers, once substantial, have become attenuated to
a shadow. No doubt the defendants will be better off if
the injunction is relaxed, but they are not suffering hard-
ship so extreme and unexpected as to justify us in saying
that they are the victims of oppression. Nothing less than a
clear showing of grievous wrong evoked by new and unforeseen
conditions should lead us to change what was decreed after years
of litigation with the consent of all concerned. 93
88. See id. at 114 (examining courts' inherent modification power). "The
power to modify the decree was reserved by its very terms, and so from the begin-
ning went hand in hand with its restraints." Id.
89. Id. (citing sources for courts' power to modify). Because courts direct an
injunction at future events, it logically follows that the injunction is subject to mod-
ification as events change. Id.
90. Id. (explaining that consent decrees may be modified as well).
91. Swift, 286 U.S. at 114-115 (defining scope of courts' power to modify).
Under Swift, only new or unforeseen circumstances could justify modification of an
order. Sizzler Family Steak Houses v. Western Sizzlin' Steakhouses, 793 F.2d 1529, 1539
(11th Cir. 1986).
92. See Swift, 286 U.S. at 115, 119 (explaining standard of review for
modifications).
93. Id. at 119 (emphasis added) (stating inquiry for appellate review of deci-
sion to modify and modification).
2004]
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3. Emergence of the Flexible Approach
In Washington v. Penwell,94 the Ninth Circuit characterized the
Swift modification standards for consent decrees as "draconian."95
The court refused to strictly apply the Swift principles because they
would result in a judicially authorized violation of a state's sover-
eign immunity.96 In other cases, courts departed from a strict appli-
cation of Swift and applied a flexible approach. 97 In United States v.
United Shoe Machinery Corp.,98 the Supreme Court employed a flexi-
ble standard when a decree's purpose had not been achieved. 99 In
doing so, it allowed modification to achieve the initial decree's pur-
pose and permitted the decree's benefit to flow to the intended
94. 700 F.2d 570 (9th Cir. 1983). In Washington, a legal service organization
sought review of the judgment of the district court, which determined that a por-
tion of a consent decree was unenforceable against the state prison. Id. at 572
(outlining issues on appeal). In refusing to enforce the provision, the district
court modified the decree. Id. (detailing lower court's decision). The Ninth Cir-
cuit affirmed, concluding that the funding provision at issue was not intended to
bind the individual agents of the state, but rather the state itself, something the
Eleventh Amendment prohibits. Id. at 575 (upholding modification).
95. Id. at 574 (explaining need for alternative test).
96. Id.
97. SeeJost, supra note 61, at 1113 (explaining development of flexible ap-
proach). Though a departure from strict interpretation of Swift, courts draw from
Justice Cardozo's own words in justifying a more flexible approach. Id. (explaining
basis for flexible approach). Justice Cardozo articulated that "[t]he distinction is
between restraints that give protection to rights fully accrued upon facts so nearly
permanent as to be substantially impervious to change, and those that involve the
supervision of changing conduct of conditions and are thus provisional and tenta-
tive." Swift, 286 U.S. at 114 (explaining need for modification where facts are sub-
ject to change). "A continuing decree of injunction directed to events to come is
subject always to adaptation as events shape the need." Id. Commentators classify
the cases employing a flexible approach into four categories: (1) "modification to
maintain congruence with the law," (2) "modification to relieve the obligor from
unfairly oppressive or inefficient decrees," (3) "modification to effectuate the
rights of the beneficiary," and (4) "modification to serve the public interest." Jost,
supra note 61, at 1114 (categorizing cases utilizing flexible approach).
98. 391 U.S. 244 (1968).
99. Id. at 248-49 (holding that flexible standard is appropriate where decree's
purpose had not been achieved).
When interpreting a consent decree, courts utilize the same rules as those
used to interpret a contract. See Reynolds v. Roberts, 202 F.3d 1303, 1312 (11th
Cir. 2000) (citing Jacksonville Branch, NAACP v. Duval Cty School Bd., 978 F.2d 1574,
1578 (11th Cir. 1992)). A court will look to extrinsic evidence to determine the
parties' intent only if a provision is ambiguous. Id. (explaining when extrinsic evi-
dence is relevant). The Supreme Court stated that "any command of a consent
decree or order must be found 'within its four comers,' and not by reference to
any purposes of the parties or of the underlying statutes." United States v. ITT
Continental Baking Co., 420 U.S. 223, 233 (1975) (citing United States v. Armour
& Co., 402 U.S. 673, 682 (1971)) (internal quotations omitted).
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beneficiary.100 In Duran v. Elrod,101 the Seventh Circuit recognized
that modification is appropriate when enforcing a decree without
modification would be detrimental to the public interest.102
In Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail,103 an institutional re-
form case, the Supreme Court recognized the flexible approach.10 4
The Court explained that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)
100. See United States v. United Shoe Machinery, 391 U.S. 244, 248-49 (1968).
United Shoe Machinery arose out of a civil suit brought by the United States, alleging
that the defendant monopolized the shoe manufacturing machinery trade. Id. at
245 (explaining procedural posture). The lower court entered an injunction, en-
joining United from further monopolization. Id. at 246 (finding in favor of plain-
tiffs). After the injunction's terms failed to achieve their purpose, the government
petitioned the court for modification. Id. at 247 (explaining factual background
and procedural posture). After distinguishing the case from Swift, the Court held
that the court possesses a duty to prescribe relief which will terminate the illegal
action. Id. at 250 (modifying decree). "If the decree has not, after 10 years,
achieved its 'principal objects'".., then "the time has come to prescribe other"...
.means to achieve the result." Id. at 251-52 (reasoning necessity for modification).
The United Shoe Machinery holding "indicates that an injunction may be modi-
fied to impose more stringent requirements on the defendant when 'the original
purposes of the injunction are not being fulfilled in any material respect."' Exxon
Corp. v. Texas Motor Exchange, 628 F.2d 500, 503 (5th Cir. 1980) (quoting 11 C.
Wright & A. Miller, FEDERAL PRACriCE AND PROCEDURE § 2961 (1973)).
101. 760 F.2d 756 (7th Cir. 1985).
102. Id. at 759-61 (holding that modification is appropriate when failure
would result in damage to public interest). In Duran, the defendants sought modi-
fication of a consent decree to allow "double bunking" in a Cook County Jail. Id.
at 758 (explaining factual background of case).
The court explained that in "deciding whether to modify a decree the district
judge cannotjust appeal to the sanctity of contracts; he must consider the concrete
impact of modification on both parties" and the public. Id. at 760 (explaining
factors to consider in modification). In considering the modification, the court
characterized the plaintiffs' hardship, short-term double bunking, as modest. Id.
(analyzing hardship resulting without modification). As for the impact on the
public if the court denied modification, Judge Posner believed releasing 500 felons
would amount to ajudicially mandated crime wave. Id. at 761 (analyzing hardship
resulting without modification).
Though the arguments for double bunking - delay in building construction,
a rising prison population, taxpayer and citizen resistance to expansion ofjails -
were well known when the court entered the initial consent decree, the court
noted that this was not a sufficient ground to deny modification. Id.
In Duran, the decree's purpose was to create constitutionally compliant condi-
tions in the jail. See id. at 757 (outlining requirements of decree). Though the
Seventh Circuit modified the no double bunking provision, the modification was
within the scope of the decree's purpose as the Constitution does not forbid
double bunking. See id. at 762 (holding that court did not abuse its discretion).
103. 502 U.S. 367 (1992). Petitioners sought review of the decision denying
the sheriff's motion to modify a consent decree entered to correct unconstitu-
tional conditions at a countyjail. See id. at 376-78 (explaining procedural posture).
104. Id. at 383 (identifying flexible approach). The Supreme Court relied
upon lower courts' previous recognition of a more flexible standard. Id. at 381
(identifying flexible approach).
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permits a more flexible standard than that announced in Swift. 10 5
The Court cited lower courts' practice in implementing and modi-
fying decrees to demonstrate the need for a flexible approach. 10 6
The Court also recognized that a court may modify a consent de-
cree (1) when changed factual circumstances make the decree sub-
stantially more burdensome, (2) when enforcing the decree would
injure the public interest, or (3) where required obligations be-
come illegal. 10 7 Under the flexible standard, "[a] party seeking
modification of a... consent decree bears the burden of establish-
ing that a significant change in circumstances warrants revision of
the decree." 10 8 When a moving party meets the standard, the court
considers whether the modification is properly tailored to the
changed circumstance. 10 9
Under the new approach, changed circumstances in fact or law
still justify modification; however, courts no longer require that the
change be coupled with a grievous wrong or extreme hardship. 110
In System Federation No. 91 v. Wright, "' the Court modified a consent
decree where changes in law permitted union shop agreements that
the Railway Labor Act 1 2 and the original consent decree prohib-
ited.' 13 The Court found that the district court possessed statutory
authority to adopt the consent decree." 4 The Court concluded
that it must be permitted to modify the decree's terms to advance
legislative objectives when the legislation is amended.11 5
105. Id. at 378-80 (rationalizing flexible approach despite strong language of
Swift). The Court insisted that the Rule did not misread Swift. Id. at 380 (recon-
ciling flexible approach with Rule and Swift).
106. Id. at 381 (explaining need for flexible approach).
107. Id. at 384, 388 (clarifying flexible approach's applicability).
108. Rufo, 502 U.S. at 383 (explaining flexible standard).
109. See id. (explaining second part of flexible approach inquiry).
110. See generally System Federation No. 91 v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642 (1961)
(permitting modification where change in law occurred though no showing of
grievous wrong).
111. 364 U.S. 642 (1961).
112. 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1945) (amended by 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1951)).
113. See System Federation No. 91, 364 U.S. at 652-53 (holding that district court
erred in denying motion to modify consent decree after change in law permitted
what was formerly illegal).
114. See id. at 650-51 (discussing courts' power to modify).
115. See id. (discussing courts' power to modify).
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IV. NARRATIVE ANALYSIS
A. Jurisdiction - Did the District Court Modify the Decree?
Before addressing the merits of EPA's appeal, the Eleventh Cir-
cuit examined its jurisdiction to review the action. 1 6 The Sierra
Club asserted that the Eleventh Circuit lacked jurisdiction under
Title 28 of the United States Code section 1292(a) (1) because
the district court's order, requiring EPA to create implementation
plans, did not modify the consent decree. 117 In response, EPA ar-
gued that the court had jurisdiction over the appeal because the
district court modified the decree. 118
In determining whether the district court had modified the de-
cree, the Eleventh Circuit noted that precedent requires a review-
ing court to ask whether the district court's appraisal of the consent
decree was "a gross misinterpretation of the decree's original com-
mand."'1 19 Under this analysis, a reviewing court must ascertain the
legal relationship created by the original consent decree and
decide whether the order under review altered the relationship
in a 'Jurisdictionally significant way."120 Next, the Eleventh Circuit
looked to the four corners of the consent decree to determine what
relationship it established between the parties. 121
The Eleventh Circuit found that the consent decree required
EPA to establish TMDLs if Georgia failed to do so. 122 To determine
116. See Sierra Club III, 296 F.3d 1101, 1028-32 (11th Cir. 2002) (analyzing
court's jurisdiction). The court concurred with the parties that the district court's
order did not fall within the terms of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 or the collateral order
doctrine. Id. at 1029 n.6 (analyzing court's jurisdiction).
117. Id. at 1029 (explaining Sierra Club's jurisdictional argument). Based
upon a proposed rule, Sierra Club argued that implementation plans should be
read into TMDL establishment. Id. at 1030 n.10 (explaining Sierra Club's jurisdic-
tional argument).
Because the statute and regulation referenced in the decree created no ambi-
guity as to whether the establishment of TMDLs included implementation plans,
the court denied Sierra Club's request to read implementation plans into man-
dated TMDL establishment. See id. 1030 (rejecting Sierra Club's argument).
118. See id. at 1028-29 (detailing EPA's assertion that court possessed
jurisdiction).
119. Id. at 1029 (citing Birmingham Fire Fighters Ass'n 117 v. Jefferson
County, 280 F.3d 1289, 1293 (11th Cir. 2002) (discussing whether district court
modified or simply interpreted decree).
120. Id. (citing Birmingham, 280 F.3d at 1292) (discussing second step in de-
termining whether district court modified decree).
121. Sierra Club III, 296 F.3d at 1029 (citing Reynolds v. Roberts, 202 F.3d
1303, 1312 (11th Cir. 2000)) (using contract principles to interpret consent
decree).
122. See id. (finding that consent decree required EPA to establish TMDLs on
certain conditions). The court noted that EPA complied with the consent decree's
terms. See id. at 1029 n.8 (detailing EPA compliance with decree's orders).
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whether establishing TMDLs required EPA to implement plans, the
court again looked to the decree's terms.123 The Eleventh Circuit
explained that none of the referenced material commanded EPA to
implement plans as part and parcel of establishing TMDLs. 124 Ex-
amining the decree as a whole, the court noted that it unmistakably
required EPA to establish TMDLs under certain circumstances, but
it plainly failed to require implementation. 125
The Eleventh Circuit then addressed the district court's rea-
soning that the consent decree required implementation plans. 126
Rejecting the assertion that TMDL establishment without imple-
mentation amounted to a hollow ceremony, the court explained
that the decree placed the problematic task of establishing TMDLs
on EPA, while the implementation obligation rested with Geor-
gia. 127 Discarding the district court's second rationale for its inter-
123. See id. at 1030 (finding that establishing TMDLs does not include imple-
menting TMDLs). The decree adopted the CWA's definition of a TMDL. See id.
(noting meaning provided in section 303(d)(1)(C) of CWA).
124. See Sierra Club III, 296 F.3d at 1030 (finding lack of implementation re-
quirement). Citing the CWA and the reference regulation, the court pointed out
that "[a] TMDL is defined to be a set measure or prescribed maximum quantity of
a particular pollutant in a given waterbody ... while an implementation plan is a
formal statement of how the level of that pollutant can and will be brought down
to or kept under the TMDL." Id. (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1313 (2001); 40 C.F.R.
§ 130.2(i) (2001)).
125. See id. (finding that decree did not require EPA implementation). The
Eleventh Circuit later explained that it could not read the consent decree at issue
as having a broad purpose of achieving cleaner water, thereby including imple-
mentation into the TMDL establishment mandate. See id. at 1031-32 (citing United
States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673, 682 (1971)).
[T]he [c]ourt explained that because consent decrees are normally com-
promises between parties with opposing positions in which each party
gives up their fights to litigation . . .consent decrees should be inter-
preted as written, and not as it might have been written had the plaintiff
established his factual claims and legal theories in litigation.
Id. at 1032 (citation omitted) (internal punctuation omitted).
126. See id. at 1031-32 (rejecting district court's reasoning for modifying de-
cree). The district court reasoned that the consent decree required implementa-
tion plans because establishing TMDLs without implementing them reduces the
decree to "an academic endeavor which would have no effect on water quality in
Georgia." Id. at 1030-31 (quoting district court's reasoning). Furthermore, the
district court stated that an interpretation of the decree excluding implementation
plans clashed with the CWA's "goal of improving water quality." Id. at 1031 (detail-
ing district court's reasoning).
127. See id. at 1031 (stating that decree did not place obligation on EPA to
implement TMDLs). "Interpretting the decree as written gives it meaning, be-
cause establishing TMDLs is a meaningful and not necessarily simple step in the
process of controlling pollution." Id. (rejecting Sierra Club's hollow ceremony
argument).
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pretation, the Eleventh Circuit refused to discover a mandate out-
side the four corners of the consent decree.1 28
After reviewing the consent decree and the district court's ra-
tionale for finding that the decree called for implementation plans,
the Eleventh Circuit declared that the decree created a relationship
with Georgia in which EPA could establish, but was not required to
implement, TMDLs. 129 The Eleventh Circuit explained that the
district court's order requiring EPA to implement TMDLs ex-
ceeded that relationship.1 30 In doing so, the district court modified
the decree because it altered the established relationship between
the parties by placing a non-existing duty on EPA.1 31 Having found
a modified decree, the court concluded that it had jurisdiction to
address the merits of EPA's appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292
(a) (1).112
B. Abuse of Discretion - Did the District Court Abuse Its
Discretion When It Modified the Decree?
Once the Eleventh Circuit determined that the district court
modified the consent decree, the court evaluated whether the mod-
ification was an abuse of discretion.133 Highlighting the decree's
provisions that reserved modification power for the district court,
the Sierra Club argued that the modification fell within the district
court's discretion.134 Reasoning that the cited "boilerplate provi-
128. See id. at 1031 (citing United States v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 420 U.S.
223, 233 (1975), United States v. Atlantic Refining Co., 360 U.S. 19, 23 (1959)); see
also Hughes v. United States, 342 U.S. 353, 356-57 (1952)). In addition, the court
reasoned that the CWA cannot act as "a source of authority for changing the
[CWA's] allocation of responsibilities." Id. (rejecting Sierra Club's claim that
CWA's purpose justifies modification).
129. Sierra Club III, 296 F.3d at 1032 (finding that only EPA obligation stem-
ming from decree was to establish TMDLs for Georgia).
130. See id. (holding that district court abused discretion in modifying de-
cree).
131. See id. (citing Birmingham Fire Fighters Ass 'n 117 v. Jefferson County, 280 F.3d
1289, 1293 (11th Cir. 2002)). If a decree requires a party to perform task A, and
later a court orders the party to perform task B, the court altered the parties' legal
relationship. Id. (explaining altered legal relationship requirement and stating
that "... [t]he change is sufficiently obvious" and "blatantly or obviously wrong"
when decree did not originally require specific duty). See id. at 1032 (citing Bir-
mingham, 280 F.3d at 1293).
132. See id. (holding that court possessed jurisdiction to address merits of
appeal).
133. See id. at 1032-33(addressing merits of appeal).
134. See Sierra Club III, 296 F.3d at 1032 (explaining Sierra Club's argument
that district court did not abuse discretion). One such provision stated that the
district court may modify the decree's terms and grant further relief as justice re-
quires. See id. at 1032-33 (explaining reasoning behind Sierra Club's argument).
2004]
17
Archambault: Sierra Club v. Meiburg: Out, Damned Pollutants - Out, We Say - Wh
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2004
384 VILLANovA ENVIRONMENTAL LAw Joum.NAL [Vol. XV: p. 367
sions" did not grant any greater modification power than Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) (5), the Eleventh Circuit qualifiedly
agreed with the Sierra Club's assertion. 135 The court explained that
while the district court retained authority to modify the decree, a
party seeking modification must show: (1) "a significant change ei-
ther in factual conditions or in law," and (2) "the proposed modifi-
cation is suitably tailored to the changed circumstance."1 36
In response, the Sierra Club, relying on a proposed rule pub-
lished by EPA, attempted to demonstrate a change in the law.1 37
Not persuaded, the court pointed out that Congress never appro-
priated funds for the rule and that EPA ultimately withdrew the
prospective rule. 38 The court also found the Sierra Club's reliance
on guidance documents unconvincing.'3 9
The Sierra Club next asserted that the district court acted
within its discretion because the decree's purpose was left unaccom-
plished.1 40 The court disagreed, maintaining that the decree's pur-
pose was to establish TMDLs.' 4 ' Though the goal of clean water
motivated the Sierra Club to bring the action, the decree's purpose
was limited to completing only one step in achieving clean water. 142
The court focused on the decree's explicit terms, concluding that
A second provision disclaimed any interpretation limiting the court's modification
power. See id. (explaining Sierra Club's argument).
135. See id. at 1033 (holding that district court possessed power to modify).
136. Id. (explaining necessary showing to modify decree).
137. See id. (detailing alleged change in law).
138. See id. (rejecting Sierra Club's argument).
139. See Sierra Club III, 296 F.3d at 1033 (citing Administrative Procedures Act
which requires compliance with rulemaking procedures in order to change regula-
tions). The court noted that there was also no change in the factual circum-
stances. See id. at 1033-34 (addressing allegation of changes in factual circum-
stances). While Georgia did not implement EPA's TMDLs in the manner contem-
plated by the decree, Georgia had never carried out its duties pursuant to the
CWA. See id. at 1033 (explaining that Georgia's failure to comply with CWA does
not constitute new or changed circumstances). The court commented, "Georgia's
governmental lethargy in this area is nothing new." Id. (explaining that Georgia's
failure to comply with CWA does not constitute new or changed circumstances).
140. See id. at 1034 (explaining Sierra Club's argument). Sierra Club cited
Sizzler Family Steak Houses v. Western Sizzlin Steak House, Inc., 793 F.2d 1529,
1539 (11th Cir. 1986) and United States v. United Shoe Machinery, 391 U.S. 244,
251-52 (1968) for the proposition that a decree's failure to achieve its purpose
is a changed circumstance justifying modification. See id. (detailing Sierra Club's
argument).
141. Id. at 1034 (rejecting proposed purpose of assuring clean water).
142. See id. (stating Sierra Club's assertion that decree did not achieve pur-
pose).
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experience had not shown that the decree's purpose was incapable
of achievement.' 43
V. CRITICAL ANALYSIS
A. Jurisdiction - The District Court Modified the Consent
Decree
Applying the analysis set forth in Birmingham, the Eleventh Cir-
cuit determined that the district court modified the consent de-
cree. 144 In its principled analysis, the court utilized the correct
standard for determining whether a lower court modified an earlier
decree, thereby granting the reviewing court appellate jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a). 145 As commentators note, Con-
gress did not intend to open the floodgate to appeals with section
1292(a), and the judicial inquiry under the jurisdictional statute
serves as evidence of this intent.146 Rather than inquire as to
whether the district court merely erred in its interpretation, the
proper analysis, followed by the Eleventh Circuit, requires the court
to inquire as to whether the misinterpretation is "so blatant or obvi-
ously wrong that it leaps from the page."' 47
143. See id. (finding purpose of decree capable of accomplishment). "Under
the decree ... Georgia is still responsible for incorporating TMDLs into its NPDES
permits; and Georgia is still responsible for implementing non-point source pollu-
tion controls." Id. at 1034 (subtly suggesting other forms of relief to enforce Geor-
gia's obligations under decree).
144. See Sierra Club III, 296 F.3d at 1032 (citing Birmingham Fire Fighters Ass'n
117 v. Jefferson County, 280 F.3d 1289, 1293 (11th Cir. 2002)) (holding that
"[b]ecause the decree as written and entered did not require EPA to prepare im-
plementation plans for the TMDLs, the district court's order requiring EPA to
prepare them modified the decree because it changed the legal relationship of the
parties by 'changing the command of the earlier injunction"'). "The law is that if
the change is sufficiently obvious - if the original decree did not even arguably
require the additional task or obligation, so that the district court's interpretation
of the decree is 'blatantly or obviously wrong' - then we have jurisdiction to review
the order." Id. (citing Birmingham, 280 F.3d at 1293) (holding that Eleventh Cir-
cuit had jurisdiction to review order).
145. See K Todd Butler, Appellate Practice and Procedure, 54 MERCER L. REv.
1335, 1338-43 (2003) (reviewing Eleventh Circuit decisions regarding appellate
practice and procedure for 2002 term). For a discussion of the jurisdictional anal-
ysis set forth in Birmingham, see supra notes 71-80 and accompanying text. For a
discussion of the Eleventh Circuit's jurisdictional analysis in Sierra Club III, see
supra notes 116-32 and accompanying text.
146. See Butler, supra note 145, at 1339 (explaining purpose of section
1292(a) and how functional analysis furthers purpose). The proper analysis under
section 12 92(a) is a functional analysis where the appellate court determines if the
lower court's clarification or interpretation acted as a functional equivalent of a
modification. See id.
147. See Sierra Club IIl, 296 F.3d at 1029 (reviewing Eleventh Circuit's decision
in Birmingham).
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In Birmingham, the Eleventh Circuit found that the district
court did not modify the injunction; thus, the court lacked jurisdic-
tion to hear the appeal. 148 The interpretation at issue in that case
concerned the lower court's understanding of a clause that speci-
fied a city's responsibility for creating new non-discriminatory hir-
ing procedures.1 49 Due to the clause's ambiguity, the Birmingham
court determined that both the appellant's and the lower court's
interpretation of the clause were plausible; consequently, the lower
court's interpretation could not amount to a blatant misinterpreta-
tion of the consent decree. 150
The interpretation at issue in Sierra Club III is distinguishable
from Birmingham because, here, the decree lacks the kind of ambi-
guity that multiple plausible interpretations can resolve. 151 The
consent decree in this case provided that if Georgia failed to estab-
lish TMDLs, EPA was required to do so. 15 2 The inexorable fact,
which the Eleventh Circuit correctly recognized, was that the con-
sent decree did not mention, either expressly or by reference, any
EPA implementation responsibilities. 153 The Eleventh Circuit's de-
cision, that it possessed authority over the interpretation as a modi-
fication, is consistent with legal precedent.1 54
Furthermore, the Eleventh Circuit avoided the errors that
plagued the district court's analysis by properly adhering to prece-
dent.155 In previous cases, the Eleventh Circuit noted that courts
148. Birmingham, 280 F.3d at 1294 (applying section 1292(a)(1) analysis to
district court's interpretation of consent decree).
149. See id. at 1292-94 (applying jurisdictional test). The Wilkes class' inter-
pretation of the clause in Birmingham - "it shall be the City's responsibility to
ensure" its selection procedures do not have an adverse impact - sought to im-
pose an evidentiary burden on the city to show the absence of adverse impact. Id.
at 1294 (applying jurisdictional test). The lower court placed the burden of show-
ing an adverse impact on the plaintiffs as courts commonly place that burden on
plaintiffs in employment discrimination suits. Id. at 1292 (applying jurisdictional
test).
150. See id. at 1294 (applying jurisdictional test).
151. See generally, Sierra Club v. EPA, Civ. Action File No. 94-CV-2501-MHS
(N.D. Ga. July 17, 1997) (detailing terms of consent decree).
152. See id. at 10-14 (detailing terms of consent decree).
153. See generally id. (detailing terms of consent decree); see also Sierra Club III,
296 F.3d at 1030 (discussing whether district court's interpretation was blatant
misinterpretation).
154. See supra notes 144-76 and accompanying text for a discussion of how the
Eleventh Circuit's decision is consistent with precedent.
155. See Sierra Club III, 296 F.3d at 1028-32 (applying precedent in discussing
whether district court modified consent decree). In finding that the consent de-
cree required EPA to implement TMDLs, the district court read the purpose of the
CWA, establishing clean water, into the consent decree even though that purpose
was absent from the consent decree's express language. Id. at 1031.
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generally employ contract principles when interpreting consent de-
crees because they are a form of contract.1 56 Following these prin-
ciples, the court confined its analysis to the four corners of the
decree. 57
In confining its search to the consent decree itself, the Elev-
enth Circuit avoided confusing the decree's purpose with either the
statutory purpose or the Sierra Club's purpose for bringing the ac-
tion against EPA.158 The Eleventh Circuit appropriately followed
the Supreme Court's repeated directive that "any command of a
consent decree or order must be found within its four comers, and
not by reference to any purposes of the parties or the underlying
statutes."'159 Appealing to the Law of Contracts, this decision re-
flects a court's recognition that it should hesitate before modifying
a decree entered by consent of the parties.1 60
B. The District Court Abused Its Discretion in Modifying the
Consent Decree
In addressing the merits of the appeal, the Eleventh Circuit
properly cited the flexible approach recognized by the Supreme
Court and rejected Sierra Club's arguments on appeal. 161 In United
Shoe Machinery, the Court warned against using Swift's grievous
156. See Reynolds v. Roberts, 202 F.3d 1303, 1312 (11th Cir. 2000) (reviewing
contract interpretation).
157. See Sierra Club II, 296 F.3d at 1029-32 (looking within consent decree's
four comers and finding no ambiguity to justify using extrinsic evidence for inter-
pretation). For a discussion of consent decree interpretation and the Eleventh
Circuit's analysis of the specific consent decree's purpose, see supra notes 81-115,
140-43 and accompanying text.
158. See Sierra Club Il, 296 F.3d at 1029-32 (illustrating Eleventh Circuit's de-
sire to continue four comers analysis).
159. See id. at 1031 (citing United States v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 420 U.S.
223, 233 (1975)) (explaining that district court's analysis completely disregards
Supreme Court's instructions).
In Atlantic Refining, the Court rejected a liberal interpretation of the consent
decree, even though it might better effectuate the purposes of the laws violated.
360 U.S. 19, 23 (1959). In Hughes v. United States, the Supreme Court declined to
recognize an alleged purpose of the decree where the purpose was absent within
the four corners. 342 U.S. 353, 356-57 (1952). In this case, the Eleventh Circuit
faced a similar, narrowly drafted decree and a statute with broad purposes. See
Sierra Club Il, 296 F.3d at 1030-32. Appropriately, the court applied the same ap-
proach and refused to attach the purpose of achieving clean water to the consent
decree's narrowly drafted terms. See id.; see also Atlantic Refining, 360 U.S. at 23.
160. Sierra Club III, 296 F.3d at 1029-32 (incorporating contracts concepts to
determine purpose of consent decree); see alsoJost, supra note 61, at 1129 (urging
stability in final judgments approach for consent decree modification).
161. Sierra Club Ill, 296 F.3d at 1033-34 (citing Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County
Jail, 502 U.S. 367 (1992)) (illustrating need for changed facts or law and proposed
modification is suitably tailored to changed circumstance).
2004]
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wrong standard, noting that the strong language must be read in
light of the context. 162 The Court restated the Swift holding as fol-
lows: a court cannot change a decree in the interests of the defend-
ants if the purposes of the decree have not been achieved, omitting
the grievous wrong hyperbole. 163 Although the flexible approach
is less stringent than the Swift analysis, "[i] t does not follow that
modification will be warranted in all circumstances."' 64 While
courts and commentators recognize justifiable modification where
changes in law and fact occur, the Eleventh Circuit correctly deter-
mined that Sierra Club failed to meet its burden. 165
1. No Change in Factual Circumstances
The court, following precedent, acknowledged that changed
factual circumstances justify modification. 166 In Rufo, the court re-
manded the action for the district court to determine whether a
prison population upsurge was in fact a new or significant change
in circumstances. 167 An inconsistent record prevented the Eleventh
Circuit from characterizing the rise in prison population as pre-ex-
isting or unforeseeable.' 68 Here, no need to remand existed as the
record clearly indicated a history of non-compliance by both Geor-
gia and EPA. 169 In fact, Sierra Club's brief provided ample evi-
dence that Georgia's non-compliance in developing and imple-
menting TMDLs was foreseen; consequently, Sierra Club could not
provide a justifiable basis for modifying the decree. 170
162. See United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 391 U.S. 244, 248
(1968) (explaining district court's misconstrued interpretation of Swift).
163. See id. (explaining and restating Swift holding).
164. See Rufo, 502 U.S. at 383 (holding that district court should exercise flexi-
bility in considering requests for modification).
165. See Sierra Club III, 296 F.3d at 1033-34 (showing that Sierra Club failed to
show change in law or factual circumstances after consent decree was entered);
Jost, supra note 61, at 1115 (noting that most courts permit modification to: (1)
maintain congruence between decree and law it effectuates; (2) relieve obligor
from unfair, oppressive, or inefficient decree; (3) effectuate rights of beneficiary;
and (4) serve public interest).
166. See Sierra Club III, 296 F.3d at 1033-34.
167. See Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 385 (1991) (ex-
pressing confusion over whether upsurge in prison population changed circum-
stances due to inconsistent record).
168. Id. 385-86 (instructing district court to determine whether population
upsurge was foreseen).
169. See Sierra Club III, 296 F.3d at 1033 (finding no change in factual
circumstances).
170. See id. (citing Brief of Appellee Sierra Club at 3).
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2. No Change in Law
In finding the absence of a change of law to justify modifica-
tion, the Eleventh Circuit's decision remained consistent with pre-
cedent. 171 In Systems Federation, the Supreme Court noted that a
court possesses wide discretion; new circumstances involving a
change in law, rather than facts, circumscribe that discretion.
172
Nevertheless, the Eleventh Circuit correctly refused to modify the
consent decree in Sierra Club III.173 Unlike the facts of Systems Feder-
ation, Sierra Club failed to demonstrate any change in law justifying
modification. 174 The proposed rule and final rule offered by Sierra
Club failed to receive funds for implementation, and EPA withdrew
the rule. 175 Shortly stated, the law had not changed.
176
VI. IMPACT
The success of a motion to modify a decree hangs in the bal-
ance of a court's discretion. 177 Commentators raise concerns of
deferential treatment to the defendant's professional judgment and
a lack of deference to the district court's determination of the de-
cree's primary purpose when an appellate court reviews a modified
decree.' 78 The Court has aptly recognized that only parties have
171. Cf Systems Federation No. 91 v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642, 648-52 (1961)
(holding that amendment to Railway Labor Act constitutes change in lawjustifying
modification).
172. Id. at 648 (discussing effect on modification of consent decree after
amendment to Railway Labor Act).
173. See Sierra Club III, 296 F.3d at 1034 (finding that district court abused its
discretion).
174. Id. at 1032-33 (reviewing district court's modification of consent decree).
175. See Act of July 12, 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-245, 114 Stat. 511, 567 (2000)
(showing failure of proposed rule and final rule to receive funds for implementa-
tion); see also 66 Fed. Reg. 41,817 (Aug. 9, 2001) (delaying effective date of 65 Fed.
Reg. 43,586 by 18 months); 65 Fed. Reg. 43,586 (July, 13, 2000) (revising Water
Quality Planning and Management Regulation and National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System Program); 64 Fed. Reg. 46,012 (Aug. 23, 1999) (proposing revi-
sions to Water Quality Planning and Management Regulation).
None of the funds made available for fiscal years 2000 and 2001 for the
Environmental Protection Agency may be used to make a final determi-
nation on or implement any new rule relative to the Proposed Revisions
to the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Program and
Federal Anti-degradation Policy and the Proposed Revisions to the Water
Quality Planning and Management Regulations Concerning Total Maxi-
mum Daily Load, published in the Federal Register on August 23, 1999.
Act of July 12, 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-245, 114 Stat. 511, 567 (2000).
176. Sierra Club III, 296 F.3d 1033 (holding that there was no change in law).
177. SeeJost, supra note 61, at 1161-62 (concluding that decisions regarding
modification must be reached through principled analysis).
178. David I. Levine, The Modification of Equitable Decrees in Institutional Reform
Litigation: A Commentary on the Supreme Court's Adoption of the Second Circuit's Flexible
20041 389
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purposes, suggesting that the above concerns are misplaced.1 79
Furthermore, Justice Cardozo noted that "the courts task is to give
full effect to the judgment ... without going beyond its four cor-
ners . . . [t]o interpret is to explain and elucidate, not to add or
subtract from the text."180
Due to the fact specific nature of a decree, a decision regard-
ing a decree's appropriate modification cannot be reached through
rigid, formal analysis.181 Nevertheless, principled decisions evaluat-
ing modification are necessary to foster institutional legitimacy.1 82
One commentator suggests flexibility as a means to effectively en-
force decrees.1 83 As Sierra Club III demonstrates, however, the judg-
ment of the district court is not enough and flexibility can only go
so far.184 The Eleventh Circuit's decision in Sierra Club III utilized
principled analysis in applying the flexible approach. 8 5 Due to
such principled analysis, the Sierra Club did not receive the result it
desired.' 8 6
As a result, only 14% of Georgia's river and stream miles are
currently monitored, and 60% of those fail to meet water quality
standards.' 87 The 16% of 70,150 miles of streams that support no
aquatic life should be cause for concern.' 88 Nevertheless, Georgia
lacks incentive to comply with the mandates of the CWA. 189 Amidst
Test, 58 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1239, 1278 (1993) (questioning whether flexible ap-
proach will manifest commentators concerns).
179. See United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673, 681 (1971) (recognizing
that only parties have purposes).
180. See Milton Handler & Michael Ruby, Justice Cardozo, One-Ninth of the Su-
preme Court, 10 ChADozo L. Rrv. 235, 252 (1988) (displaying copy of Justice Car-
dozo's hand-written draft of the Swift decision).
181. SeeJost, supra note 61 at 1161 (concluding that decisions regarding mod-
ification must be reached through principled analysis).
182. Id. (concluding that decisions regarding modification must be reached
through principled analysis).
183. See Levine, supra note 178 at 1250, 1255 (explaining Professor Fiss' views
on modification).
184. See supra notes 116-77 and accompanying text (reviewing Eleventh Cir-
cuit's analysis).
185. See supra notes 116-77 and accompanying text (reviewing Eleventh Cir-
cuit's analysis).
186. See generally Sierra Club v. Meiburg, 296 F.3d 1021 (11th Cir. 2002).
187. Clean Water Campaign, Did you know?, available at http://www.cle-
anwatercampaign.com (last visited March 9, 2004) [hereinafter Clean Water
Campaign].
188. Id.
189. See Sierra Club v. Hankinson, 939 F. Supp. 865, 867 (N.D. Ga. 1996)
(explaining factual background of case).
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these circumstances, EPA, the agency charged with protecting our
nation's environment, refuses to take further action.19 0
Taylor L. Archambault
190. See Sierra Club III, 296 F.3d at 1027-28 (highlighting EPA refusal to imple-
ment TMDLs).
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